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Is

Turn About Fair Play? Copyright Law and the Fair Use
of Computer Software Loaded Into RAM
Chad G. Asarch
I

am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions. But

laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the
human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as
new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners and opin
ions change, with the change in circumstances, institutions must advance
also to keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear
still the coat which fitted him when a boy .

.

•

.

-Thomas Jefferson (first head of the U.S. Patent Office) 1

INTRODUCTION
Computer systems, especially those in heavy-use commercial set
tings, often require routine maintenance to continue functioning prop
erly. Many businesses turn to an independent service organization
("IS0")2 to provide computer maintenance services because ISOs fre
quently charge less than the original equipment manufacturer ("OEM")
for those services.3 The tremendous growth in computer use4 has
spawned a multi-billion dollar computer maintenance industry in the

1 . Inscription at the Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D.C.
2. An ISO, also known as a third party maintainer, is a company that services and

repairs computers that it did not manufacture.
3. Most computer users cannot afford to hire full-time employees to provide rou
tine maintenance or handle emergency repairs. See Richard H. Stem, Section II7 of the
Copyright Act: Charter of the Software Users' Rights or an Illusory Promise?, 7 W.
NEW ENG. L. REv. 459, 479-80 (1 985); Trinnie Arriola, Note, Software Copyright In·
fringement Claims After MAI Systems v. Peak Computer, 69 WASH. L. REv. 405, 424
(1 994). Although ISOs also may offer other services such as consulting, this Note fo.
cuses only on the issues invdlved in the use of software associated with computer repair
and maintenance.
4. At least one well-known commentator, however, predicts that computer use will
diminish in the future as the public realizes that computers do not offer services people
actually want and instead really represent "the biggest fraud in the world." "You can
have 3,000 newspapers" on-line on a "computer for $9,000," but for "half a dollar"
you can buy a newspaper and get the same information in a portable format that can be
taken "wherever you want to go. You can't take a computer to the toilet." Jackie
Mason, Love Thy Neighbor (live monologue, Apr. 20, 1 996), quoted in Taking a P.C. to
the Toilet, N.Y . TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1 996, at E6.
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United States,5 and ISOs and OEMs have become engaged in fierce
competition for this computer service business.6
The struggle between ISOs and OEMs to capture this expanding
market has spilled over into the courts, spawning a number of recent
decisions in the area of copyright law that have added significant legal
consequences to the mechanics of computer operation and maintenance.

In particular, the Ninth Circuit in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc.1 ruled that, for purposes of the Copyright Act,8 loading software
into a computer's active memory - known as Random Access Memory
("RAM" )9 - from a permanent storage device such as a hard disk, dis
kette, or Read Only Memory ("ROM" )10 results in the making of a
"copy" of the software.11 A user engages in "copying" under the Act
by making a "fixed" copy of a copyrighted work.12 Concluding that
software stored in RAM is "sufficiently permanent" to be perceived
and used by the computer, the court in

Peak held that software loaded

into RAM constitutes a "fixed" copy of the original stored in perma
nent memory.13

5. Recent reports estimate that businesses in the United States spent over $23 bil
lion on computer support and maintenance in 1995. See Dinah Zeiger, Keeping Those
Bits in Line: Computer Repair Business Growing More Competitive, DENV. POST, Jan.
29, 1996, at C l.
6. See id. at C l (predicting that "the already huge computer service, maintenance,
and repair industry will only get bigger and more fiercely competitive as more personal
computers are installed in businesses and homes").
7. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994).
8. 17 u.s.c.§§ 101-710 (1994).
9. See RICHARD T. CHRISTOPH & GLENN T. SMrnI.
COMPUTER LITERACY 42.
44 (2d ed. 1993).
10. All computers rely on some form of long-term memory to store software and
data. A computer continues to store items in this permanent memory regardless of
whether the computer is turned on or off. See V. CARL HAMACHER ET AL.• COM
PUTER ORGANIZATION (3d ed. 1990); JAMES V. VERGARI & VIRGINIA V. SHUE,
FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER-HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW (1991).
11. See Peak, 991 F.2d at 518.
12. See 17 U.S.C.§ 101 (1994).
13. See Peak, 991 F.2d at 518 (quoting 17 U.S.C.§ 101 (1994)). The court rested
its conclusion on the finding that software, particularly MAI's operating software, could
be utilized to perform the software's intended functions while in RAM. See 991 F.2d at
518. The court in Peak was the first to hold that the loading of software into a com
puter's RAM creates a copy of the software under the Copyright Act. See 991 F.2d at
519.
The court in Peak did not determine how long a copy had to be in RAM in order
to be considered fixed. However, the court in Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI
Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994), suggested that more than a momen
tary, fleeting existence in RAM is required for making a fixed copy. Courts in subse
quent decisions also have held that an ISO makes an infringing copy even if only part
of the software is copied into RAM. See, e.g., Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express
Co., No. C92 1539-FMS, 1994 WL 446049, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994) [hereinaf-
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Peak decision has serious ramifications for an ISO's ability to

compete in the computer service market because an ISO generally must
load or "copy" software into RAM when servicing computers. The
simple act of turning on a computer requires the activation of the com
puter's operating software, which is designed to make the computer per
form its most basic functions. 1 4 Operating software includes both oper
ating system software1 5 and utility or diagnostic software.1 6 A computer
must store its software in some form of permanent memory. 1 7 However,
in order to use items stored in permanent memory, the computer must
load the software into RAM: software remains inert until copied into
RAM where it can be processed by the computer hardware. 1 8 Because
ter Triad J], modified, 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Triad JJ], cert. denied,
116 S. Ct 1015 (1996).
14. See CmusTOPH & SMITII, supra note 9, at 113-20; STEPHEN A. WARD &
ROBERT H. HALsTEAD, JR., COMPUTATION STRUCTURES 348-49 (1990); see also
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dis
missed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994). Computers operate by executing the commands issued
by a computer program. See Christian H. Nadan & James W. Morando, How Courts En
courage Standardization and Interoperability, COMPUTER LAW., Apr. 1993, at 12, 13.
The Copyright Act defines a "computer program" as a "set of statements or instruc
tions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain re
sult" 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
15. Operating system software manages the internal functions of the computer and
allows the computer to translate application programs that perform specific tasks, such
as word processing, into language the computer can understand, making use of the ap
plication software possible. See CHRISTOPH & SMITII, supra note 9, at 113-20; see
also Computer Assocs. Intl., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 549-50 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) (observing that "[o]perating systems are the programs that manage the resources
of the computer and allocate those resources to other programs that need them"), affd.,
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). For example, IBM computers use either Disk Operating
System ("DOS"), Operating System 2 ("OS/2"), or UNIX software as their operating
system software. See CHRISTOPH & SMITII , supra note 9, at 115-20. Microsoft Win
dows software is not an operating system; it is a "software environment" that functions
like an applications program. See id. Macintosh computers utilize a specialized systems
program that incorporates many of the functions of Microsoft Wmdows into the operat
ing software. See id.
16. Utility, diagnostic, or other computer service software often is designed to lo
cate computer errors. See CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note 9, at 113-15. Some utility
software programs automatically display an error log upon being loaded into RAM in
order to inform the user of any problems. See Peak, 991 F.2d at 518. Utility software is
usually bundled together with operating system software so that loading of the operating
system software into RAM from the permanent memory source in which it is stored
necessarily involves loading the utility software. See CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note
9, at 114.
17. See id. CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note 9, at 80.
18. See id. at 113-20. No matter how the operating system might be permanently
stored (i.e. in ROM, hard disk, or diskette), a computer cannot function unless the oper
ating system is loaded into the computer's RAM because the operating system manages
the computer's physical resources and orchestrates the execution of all programs. Thus,
a computer's operating software is loaded automatically into RAM as soon as someone
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even the lowest-level computer maintenance involves turning on the
computer and testing it to make sure that the computer functions prop
erly, 19 effective computer maintenance requires loading the operating
software into RAM.20
Under the Copyright Act, a copyright infringement claim must sat
isfy two eJements:

(1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) unautho
Peak, the OEM had li

rized "copying" of copyrighted material.21 In

censed copyrighted software22 to the computer owner (the "customer" )
under a restrictive licensing agreement that allowed the customer t o use
and copy the software during the normal operation of the computer but
prohibited the making of any copies of the software by nonlicensed par
ties.23 As a result, the court held that any copying of the software by the

turns on the computer.See Arriola, supra note 3, at 407; Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at
*5 (noting that "[i]n order to use a Triad computer, one must reproduce the operating
system software in the computer's RAM"); Advanced Computer Servs.of Mich., Inc. v.
MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F.Supp.356, 360 (E.D. Va. 1994) (observing that "[r]egardless of
the means of loading, none of the [computer] programs can communicate with the com
puter unless they are first loaded into RAM").
19. See, e.g., Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *5. In addition, proper maintenance
often requires making archival copies on disk or tape in order to ensure that information
stored on the computer is not lost during maintenance (i.e., when the computer is
reformatted or rebooted after it has been serviced).See Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *6.
20. See Katrine Levin, Note, MAI v. Peale Should Loading Operating Software
into RAM Constitute Copyright Infringement?, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 649
(1994).
21. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991);
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162
(9th Cir. 1977).
22. Under the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, computer programs
clearly are entitled to copyright protection as literary works. See 17 U.S. C.§§ 101, 117
(1994). Of course, an OEM bringing a copyright infringement claim against an ISO
must establish actual ownership of a valid copyright by showing that the software is
original and that the OEM complied with the applicable statutory formalities. See Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl., Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 n.S (1st Cir. 1995), affd. by an
equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996); Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural
Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1340 (5th Cir.1994). For the purposes of discussion, this
Note assumes that the OEM has proven ownership of a valid copyright of the software
in question.
23. A representative software license used by MAI (the OEM in Peak) provided in
.
part:
(a) License
Customer may use the Software . .. solely to fulfill Customer's
own internal information processing needs on the particular items of Equipment
•

•

•

.

(b) Customer Prohibited Acts
Any possession or use of the Software .. . not
expressly authorized under this License or any act which might jeopardize
[MAl]'s rights or interests in the Software . . . is prohibited, including without
limitation, examination, disclosure, copying, modification, reconfiguration, aug
mentation, adaptation, emulation, visual display or reduction to visually percepti
ble form or tampering.
.

• •

.
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IS024 without the permission of the OEM occurred "beyond the scope
of the license"25 and therefore constituted copyright infringement.26
A

"Peak claim" arises when: (1) an OEM transfers computer op

erating software to a customer under a restrictive licensing agreement,
and (2) an ISO copies the software into RAM without the OEM's per
mission or "beyond the scope of the license" while servicing the com
puter.27 In other words, any third party makes an infringing "copy" of
licensed operating software

simply by turning on the customer's computer without the OEM's permission. The Peak decision has widespread
significance given the growing trend among OEMs28 to license rather
than transfer ownership of software to customers.29
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994). The terms of the license in Peak are typical of many
such restrictive licensing agreements in the software industry.
24. In Peak, personnel employed by Peak Computer (the ISO) copied operating
system software and diagnostic/utility software into RAM by turning on the computer
while servicing MAI customers. See 991 F.2d at 517-19. The ISO then used the
software, which automatically generated an error log when copied into RAM, to iden
tify and correct system errors. See 991 F.2d at 517-19.
25. 991 F.2d at 517-19. The Copyright Act grants a number of exclusive rights to
the holder of a copyright, including the exclusive right to make and distribute "copies"
of the copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). The owner of a copyright may
transfer these rights to others under an exclusive license. See 17 U.S.C. § 20 l{d) (1994).
A user infringes on the rights granted to a copyright holder by making or distributing
copies of the copyrighted material without the permission of the copyright owner when
such copying occurs be yond the scope of a license. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 50l(a)
(1994); SOS, Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989).
26. See Peak, 991 F.2d at 517-19.
27. See-991 F.2d at 517-19.
28. Most OEMs own the copyright to the operating software that runs the com
puters sold by the OEM. See Levin, supra note 20, at 678 n.167. Although the software
developer, copyright holder, and OEM may be separate entities, generally the same en
tity that manufactures a computer also will produce and hold the copyright to the oper
ating software for that computer.
29. The practice of licensing rather than selling software is common across the in
dustry. See Albert P. Cefalo, Software Licensing, in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND
LmGATION: 1994, at 385 (PLI Pat Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. 382, 1994) (providing a list of different license types).
The licenses often prohibit the customer from allowing others to use the software for
any purpose, including computer maintenance. See Appellants' Brief at 5, Triad II, 64
F.3d 1330. In fact, MAI began employing restrictive licenses specifically as a way to
limit competition in the computer service market from Peak Computer. Peak Computer
enticed four MAI employees, including MAi's customer service manager, to work for
Peak Computer. Peak Computer subsequently convinced a large percentage of MAI cus
tomers to switch over to Peak Computer for computer maintenance services. See Brian
J. Murphy, Case Note, Loading Software into RAM Creates a "Copy": MAI Systems
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 10 SANTA Cl.ARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 499,
500 (1994). In response, MAI hired a leading computer service consultant to regain its
lost share of the service market. The consultant recommended that MAI sue to enjoin
Peak Computer from servicing MAI computers. The consultant suggested that MAI

·
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In a Peak situation, an OEM has two separate potential causes of
action: (1) a breach of contract claim only against the customer, and (2)
a copyright infringement claim against the ISO
a Peak claim. Al
though this Note only addresses the copyright claim, a brief comparison
of the two causes of action will help clarify the scope of the copyright
claim. The breach of contract claim arises because the customer violates
the terms of the license by allowing the ISO or any other unauthorized
third party to use the software.30 The OEM cannot bring a breach of
contract claim against the ISO because the ISO is not a party to the re
strictive licensing agreement. In contrast, the OEM can bring a copy
right claim only against the ISO and not against the customer because
any copying performed by the customer does not occur "beyond the
scope of the license. "31 The ISO only infringes on the copyright when
the ISO performs the copying. Thus, no copyright cause of action ac-

bring a copyright infringement action and argue to the court that loading software into
constituted "copying" under the Copyright Act, a course of action which ulti
mately proved successful. See Levin, supra note 20, at 650. This note uses the term
"sales" to mean sales of licenses, rather than sales of copies of the software in the §
117 sense. See infra note 31 (noting that the analysis would be different if customers
were owners of copies of the software, instead of licenses).
30. Although no court has held that a customer's actions constitute a breach of
contract, such a result is an obvious conclusion based on the terms of the license. How
ever, aside from the financial impediments to bringing numerous individual breach of
contract suits against customers, it is uhlikely that an OEM would actually pursue litiga
tion against its own customers given the strong probability that doing so would drive
away those customers in droves. See also infra note 122 (discussing the antitrust issues
raised by such a breach of contract claim).
31. In addition, the Peak ruling does not affect customers who own, rather than
hold licenses to, software.§ 117 of the Copyright Act allows for "owners" of copies of
computer programs to make copies of the program provided "(1) that such new copy or
adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program ...
or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only." 17 U.S.C.§ 117
(1994). Because copying a computer program into RAM is essential in order to use the
software, an ISO would not violate copyright law by loading the software into RAM if
§ 117 covered software held by a customer under a restrictive license agreement. How
ever, in a one-sentence footnote, the court in Peak dismissed the applicability of a§ 117
defense to a Peak claim by ruling that users of licensed software "do not qualify as
'owners' of the software and are not eligible for protection under § 117." Peak, 991
F.2d at 518 n.5; see also Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F.
Supp. 356, 367 (E.D. Va. 1994). Some commentators have argued that "rightful posses
sors," including licensees, should be covered under the exemptions in§ 117. See, e.g.,
Michael E. Johnson, Note, The Uncertain Future of Computer Software Users' Rights in
the Aftermath of MAI Systems, 44 DUKE LJ. 327, 341-47 (1994). Recent legislation
has been introduced by Rep.Joseph Knollenberg (R-MI) to include rightful possessors
as owners under§ 117.See H.R. 533, 104th Cong. (1995). Nevertheless, because Con
gress actually replaced the term "rightful possessor" with the word "owner" when
drafting the legislation, it is likely that courts will be reluctant to extend§ 117 to right
ful possessors, including licensees.

RAM
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crues where the customer allows the ISO to use the software while ser
vicing the computer as long as the customer activates the computer and
loads the software into RAM.32
These problems would be avoided if the courts considered the
ISO's use of a computer's operating software "copied" into RAM to be
a "fair use" of the software.33 Under section

107 of the Copyright Act,

a user may create copies of a copyrighted work without violating the
Copyright Act if the user's activities constitute a "fair use. "34 The stat32. The court in Triad I suggested that no copyright infringement would occur
where the customer starts up the computer before the ISO arrives or where an ISO rep
resentative instructs the customer "to start up or reset the computer whenever necessary
to perform various service functions." Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co.,
No. C92 1539-FMS, 1994 WL 446049, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994). Thus, an ISO
would not violate copyright law by borrowing the customer to tum on the computer and
punch the necessary keys to boot up the service software because any copy made by the
customer would be permitted under the license. But see Advanced Computer Servs., 845
F. Supp. at 367 (holding that the customer/licensee infringes on the copyright by permit
ting third party access to the software).
33. See Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *6-*7. Application of the fair use defense to
a Peak claim would not affect the OEM's potential breach of contract claim against the
customer.
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). Courts also have recognized the defense of copy
right misuse to prevent the inappropriate expansion of the limited monopoly created by
the copyright. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); see
also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGIIT
§ 13.09[A] (1995). As a result of the recent Fifth Circuit decision in DSC Communica
tions Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996), some commentators
have argued that misuse might be applicable to Peak cJaims. See Mark Walsh, High

Tech Firms Cheer Ruling in Copyright Case: Court Says Software Makers Can't Misuse
Law to Create a Monopoly, THE RECORDER, May 29, 1996, at 1, 12. The court in DSC
Communications applied copyright misuse to invalidate an OEM's attempt to use copy
right protection to prevent third parties from developing competing microprocessor
cards. See DSC Communications, 81 F.3d at 601-02. When competitors tested the alter
native microprocessing cards for compatibility with an OEM computer's switching sys
tem, the cards automatically downloaded the OEM's copyrighted operating software
into the computer's RAM. See DSC Communications, 81 F.3d at 599, 601.
However, the misuse defense generally is limited to situations where a copyright
holder attempts to use copyright protection to prevent others from developing alterna
tive works that compete with the original. See N IMMER & NIMMER , supra, § 13.09[A].
As a result, courts routinely have rejected copyright misuse as a valid defense for an
ISO against a Peak claim because the plaintiff OEMs' licensing agreements have not in
cluded restrictions designed to prevent ISOs from developing competing software. See
Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1337 (9th Cir. 1995); Data
Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1169-70 (1st Cir. 1994); In
re lndep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1537, 1541-42 (D. Kan. 1995) (find
ing no copyright misuse where the OEM does not prohibit a third party from develop
ing its own diagnostic software); Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 366-67;
Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *14. The Fifth Circuit in DSC Communications focused
on the OEM's attempt to prevent its competitors from developing alternative
microprocessor cards, rather than on any effort to stymie competition in the computer
service market. See DSC Communications, 81 F.3d at 601. Consequently, courts em-
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ute directs courts to weigh four factors in determining whether a partic
ular use is fair:

(1) the purpose of the use, (2) the nature of the copy
righted work, (3) the amount of the work copied, and (4) the effect of

the use upon the market for the copyrighted work.35 However, a precise

definition of what qualifies as a fair use so far has eluded courts and
commentators.36 Instead, courts have characterized the fair use defense
as an equitable doctrine that turns on a determination of the specific
facts involved in a given copyright infringement case.37 Although the
Ninth Circuit in

Peak did not address the issue of fair use, courts in

subsequent rulings have concluded that ISOs cannot rely successfully
on the fair use defense against a Peak claim.38

This Note argues that the fair use defense should be applied to

ISOs charged with copyright infringement under a

Peak claim. Part I

maintains that the four fair use factors identified by Congress in the

Copyright Act support a finding of fair use in

Peak claims, primarily

because an ISO's computer maintenance activities do not impact ad
versely the market for sales of computer software. Part II contends that
equity and policy considerations support application of the fair use de

fense to

Peak claims. Specifically, Part II reasons that preventing an
Peak claim

ISO from successfully raising the fair use defense against a

would grant OEMs the ability to exclude ISOs from the computer ser

vice market simply by licensing rather than selling operating software
to their customers. While an OEM should be able to license software to

its customers, an OEM should not be able to use copyright protection
improperly to acquire a

de facto monopoly in the computer maintenance

market.

ploying the reasoning in DSC Communications would not apply the copyright misuse
defense to Peak claims because they only involve competing services, not the develop
'
ment of competing computer hardware or software. See Walsh, supra, at 12.
35. See 17 U.S. C. § 107 (1994).
36. See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.05; American Geophysical
Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing H.R. REP No. 94-1476, at
65-66 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S. C. C.A.N. 5659, 5679 (noting that "no generally ap
plicable definition [of fair use] is possible")).
37. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterp., 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985) (citing· H.R. REP No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C. C.A.N.
5659, 5679 (stating that "each case raising the question must be decided on its own
facts")); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.05.
38. Courts have considered the fair use defense in two cases involving Peak
claims. In both cases the courts found that an ISO defending against a Peak claim did
not have recourse to the fair use defense because of the commercial nature of the use
and the ISO's failure to pay royalties to the OEM. See Triad II, 64 F.3d 1330; Advanced
Computer Serv., 845 F. Supp. 356.
.

.
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THE FOUR FAIR USE FACTORS

This Part argues . that the fair use defense should be available to
ISOs against a

Peak claim because the four statutory fair use factors,39

particularly the market impact factor, on balance weigh in favor of fair
use. Section I.A discusses market impact, the most important of the four·
factors,40 and contends that an ISO's use of software does not nega
tively impact the market for software sales because the use is non
proliferative. Section I.B submits that despite the commercial nature of
an ISO's use of the software, the purpose of the use does not weigh
against fair use because it lacks any negative impact on the market for
sales of the software and because copying only serves as an intermedi
ate step to an otherwise fair use. section I.C postulates that the nature of
the copyrighted work supports fair use because operating software is a

functional work41 subject to less protection under copyright law. Finally,

section I.D maintains that while the software is completely copied into

RAM, the reality of computer operations offers the ISO no alternative

but to copy the entire work in order to use it. Therefore, the extent of
the copying factor also should not weigh against fair use.
A.

Market Impact

The Copyright Act directs courts to consider "the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work"42 in de
ciding fair use claims. This section argues that market impact supports
fair use because ISOs do not compete with OEMs for sales of the
39. See supra text accompanying note 35 (listing the four factors).
U.S. 207, 238 (1990); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
566 (characterizing whether the use tends to interfere with sales of the copyrighted arti
cle as "the single most important factor" bearing on whether the use is fair); Triad Sys.
Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., No. C92 1539-FMS, 1994 WL 446049, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 18, 1994); Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 780 F.
Supp. 1283, 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992); see also
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.05(AJ(4]; BRUCE A LEHMAN & RONALD
H. BROWN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND nm NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRA
STRUCTURE: REPORT OF nm WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 79 (1995) (noting that "courts have repeatedly identified [the economic effect
of the use] as the most significant of the four factors"). But see American Geophysical
Union, 60 F.3d at 926 (interpreting the omission of language highlighting the priority of
the market impact factor in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171
(1994), as an indication that all four fair use factors should be considered equally);
William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and
Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. J. 667, 693-97 (1993) (criticizing the Supreme
Court's emphasis on market impact).
41. Fair use analysis distinguishes between works that serve a functional, utilita
rian purpose and more creative works. See infra text accompanying notes 98-111.
42. 17 u.s.c. § 107(4) (1994).
40. See Stewart v. Abend, 495
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software and because an ISO's use of the software to service customers'

computers is nonproliferative: the ISO does not create any permanent,
additional copies of the software. Section

l.A.1 contends that the rele

vant market should include only the sales of copies of the software and
should exclude pot�ntial licensing fees. Section

l.A.2 maintains that an

ISO's use of licensed software while servicing computers does not neg
atively impact the relevant market.

1.

Defining the Relevant Market: Excluding Potential Licensing Fees
The relevant market in a

Peak claim should be the market for sales

of the OEM's software. Potential licensing revenues from computer
maintenance should not be included in the relevant market because do
ing so in effect would extend copyright protection to the process of ser
vicing computers - an uncopyrightable procedure.
Before an analysis of the market impact of a given use can begin,
a court must define the parameters of the potential market in question.43

When defining the relevant market, courts focus their analysis on

whether the disputed use would diminish demand for the original copy
righted work.44 Thus, the appropriate inquiry is whether the challenged
use "supplants any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work"45
or whether "it fulfills the demand for the original."46 Specifically, in
order to protect the incentives established by copyright law - to en
courage authors to bring copyrighted works to the market in the first

place- courts determine whether the challenged use would have a det
rim�ntal effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work "by di
minishing potential sales, interfering with marketability, or usurping the
market" if the use became widespread.47

43. Indeed, defining the potential market remains the central question of any mar
ket impact analysis. See Daniel M. Wall & Charles S. Crompton, III, The Antitrust and
Intellectual Property Law Issues: Exploiting Computer Software Copyrights in Multiple
"Markets," 8 ANTITRUST, Summer 1994, at 20.
44. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986).
45. Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 1983).
46. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438; see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterps., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985) (holding that the fair use doctrine is designed to pre
clude uses that "supersede the use of the original") (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342, 344-45 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)); Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d
1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1984); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 631 F. Supp. 1432, 1438
(S.D.N.Y.), affd., 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34,
§ 13.05[B][4] (noting that courts investigate whether the disputed use satisfies "the
same purpose" or performs the same "function" as the copyrighted work).
47. Sega Enterps. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992) (ci
tation omitted); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177
(1994); Sega Enterp., Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (arguing
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An average layperson considering the issue for the first time might
conclude intuitively that potential licensing fees should be included in
the relevant market by reasoning as follows: assuming that loading
software into RAM constitutes copyright infringement, certainly the
ISO should pay the OEM for any actual use the ISO makes of the
software after it has been copied into RAM An OEM should be able to
.

collect permission fees from an ISO just as a wrench manufacturer
should be able to collect fees from a plumber who uses the wrench to
service pipes because both the OEM and the wrenchmaker would ex
pect to sell additional copies of their products to everyone who uses
them. Similarly, OEMs have argued that denial of the fair use defense
is necessary in order to insure that OEMs recoup the cost of creating

the operating software either by forcing ISOs to purchase licenses to
use the operating software or by reaping the profits that would be gen
erated by having the OEMs perform the maintenance themselves - the
obvious consequence of preventing ISOs from entering the market.48
These positions seem bolstered by the fact that an ISO makes extensive

use of the operating software in RAM while servicing a customer's

computer. For example, while utility software generally does not fix
computer problems, ISOs often rely on utility software to generate error
logs and to identify and diagnose system problems.49

However, the layperson's and the OEMs' arguments focus on the

wrong issue by confusing protection against
tection against

unauthorized use with pro

unauthorizf!d copying.50 Their reasoning mistakes the

that one need only show that the challenged use would diminish the copyrighted work's
potential market to negate a claim of fair use) (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568).
48. See Appellee's Brief on the Merits at 26-28, Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern
Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995).
49. In Peak, the software loaded into RAM permitted a user "to view the system
error log and diagnose the problem with the computer." MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Com
puter, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994).
However, if the software actually fixed a computer's problems by itself, there would be
no great need for ISOs to service the computer.
50. In fact, there are two separate distinctions that elude the layperson. The first
distinction is between "use" and "copying." Although the copying of the software
from ROM to RAM is technically a "use" for infringement purposes, it is not the
"use" for which the customer pays the ISO. The customer pays the ISO to service the
computer; this "use" of the software to service the computer, once the copy is already
in RAM, is not an infringement This Note refers to "use" in the latter sense.
The second distinction deals with the way in which the copying and use are "un
authorized." The use (in the servicing-computers sense) is unauthorized for the cus
tomer as a matter of contract law
the contract is the license agreement between the
OEM and the customer. Therefore, because the ISO is not privy to the license agree
ment, the use (in the servicing-computers sense) is not "unauthorized" for the ISO. On
the other hand, because the ISO's copying of the software from ROM to RAM is a po
tential copyright infringement, the copying is unauthorized for the ISO as a matter of
-
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Peak claim, which prohibit third-party

use of the software, with the reach of copyright law. Copyright law pre

vents the creation of an alternative market for copies of copyrighted

works by parties other than the copyright holder. Such protection pro

vides copyright holders with a legitimate expectation of income from
the sale of

copies of the work, but does not create any expectation of
gain from a third-party's use of the work. Protecting against unautho
rized uses of an item like a wrench is the province of patent law, not
copyright law. Thus, the relevant market under fair use analysis should

include only the market for additional copies of the work, not the mar

ket for uses of the work. This is why, when determining whether the
fair use defense applies, courts have distinguished between copying that

constitutes "simple exploitation of another's creative efforts" and copy

ing incident to the use of the copyrighted material - only the former
being prohibited by copyright law.51

Both the layperson and the OEM err by concluding that the use of

the copy of software in RAM detracts from the value of the original,

thereby treating the creation and use of a copy of software in RAM the
same as making copies of a newspaper article on a Xerox machine for

use instead of the original. By doing so, they fail to recognize the

unique characteristics of copying software into RAM. An item loadf'.d

into RAM is an "ephemeral" copy that only exists in RAM for as long
as

the computer is turned on while the original remains permanently

stored in some form of long-term memory.52 When the computer is
copyright law, unless the use is deemed a fair use. See supra notes 30-32 and accompa
nying text.

51. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1523. For example, the Supreme Court in Campbell
looked favorably on application of the fair use defense to the use of lyrics and music
copied from Roy Orbison's licensed and copyrighted classic rock ballad "Oh, Pretty
Woman" in a rap music parody recorded by 2 Live Crew. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Mu
sic, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994). The Court limited the market impact analysis to an
investigation of whether sales of 2 Live Crew's version of the song would negatively
impact sales of copies of the original:See 510 U.S. at 590-92. In other words, the Court
ruled that the proper inquiry should focus exclusively on the question of whether buy
ing 2 Live Crew's "copy" of the original would disincline consumers to buy Orbison's
version, not on whether the band's unauthorized use of the lyrics and music adversely
affected permission fees collected by the copyright holders. If no one purchasing the 2
Live Crew song would have bought the Orbison original anyway, then no negative mar
ket impact would have resulted from 2 Live Crew's use of the copied lyrics despite 2
Live Crew's unauthorized use of the licensed work. See 510 U.S. at 591-92.
52. See CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note 9, at 43-44. Indeed, commentators have
sharply criticized the ruling in Peak for completely misconstruing the meaning of the
term "fixed copy." See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 31, at 334 (arguing that because a
computer program in RAM is "a transitory and ephemeral writing, like a message writ
ten in sand," it should not be considered "fixed in the same way a program copied onto
permanent, read-only memory (ROM) is") (internal quotation marks omitted). Conclud-
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turned off, the infonnation in RAM is erased.53 Because software only
can be used in RAM, copying software into RAM does not create a
real, additional copy of the software that can be used instead of the
original, unlike copies of, say, a newspaper article that can serve as a
substitute for the original.
In addition, the market impact of a given use should be gauged

only for the potential market of the copyrightable product, not the mar
ket for related but

uncopyrightable activities.s4 Processes, functions, and

uses are not copyrightable.ss In particular, the process of servicing a
computer, even when such a process relies on the use of copyrighted
software, is not copyrightable.56 Alternatively,

one can copyright

ing that software in RAM represents a "fixed" copy of the same software in ROM or
on a hard disk is similar to,arguing that a person's shadow represents a copy of that per
son because it can be seen around the corner before the person comes into view. More
over, Peak's detractors point to the House Report that accompanied the 1976 Copyright
Act to show that Congress did not intend for software in RAM to be considered fixed.
See H.R REP No. 94-1476, at 53, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666 (stating
that the "definition of fixation would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or
transient reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen . . . or captured mo
mentarily in the 'memory' of a computer").
53. See CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note 9, at 43-44.
54. See Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 1983).
55. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship ex
tend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or em
bodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
The Copyright Act does grant copyright holders copyright protection on works de
rived from the work with the original copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994); NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.05[A][4]. The Copyright Act defines a derivative work
as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works . . . or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). However, a de
rivative work must meet the same standards as an original work to receive copyright
protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). Thus, processes, even if derived from a copy
rightable work, do not qualify as derivative works subject to copyright protection.
56. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., No. C92 1539-FMS, 1994
WL 446049, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994) (stating that because the OEM's "copy
rights do not extend to the methods, procedures, and processes involved in servicing" a
computer manufactured by the OEM, injury to the OEM's "position in the service mar
ket is not c;ognizable under copyright law"); see also H.R REP No. 94-1476, at 57, re
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 ("Section 102(b) is intended, among other
things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the [computer] programmer is the
copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or methods
embodied in the program are not within the scope of copyright law"). OEMs do not de
serve copyright protection over the process of servicing computers when such service
involves the use of copyrighted diagnostic software despite the substantial investment of
time, money, and labor they may have put into the development of the software. The
Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 490 U.S. 340 (1991),
rejected the "sweat of the brow" doctrine and held that substantial effort alone cannot
confer copyright status on an otherwise uncopyrightable work.
.

.
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software designed to perform a diagnostic service, but one cannot copy
right the process by which one uses the software because computer

maintenance is a process without authorship. Thus, the only relevant
market courts should consider is

the market for sales of the software,

the sole market in which an ISO could usurp the demand for the copy
rightable work. Courts should

not include in the relevant market the

business of servicing computers and the potential licensing fees that
would be generated by requiring ISOs to pay for the use of licensed
software.
Copyright protection does not provide any expectation of recoup
ing software development costs from computer maintenance activities,
regardless of .how the OEM wishes to recover those costs. OEMs can
recover the cost of development by charging higher prices for copies of
their software, but should not be able to recoup those costs through ser
vice contracts by operation of copyright law. As a result, the software

price would reflect its true cost instead of forcing the customer to pay
part of the cost of the software through the OEM's higher service rates.

The two courts that have considered the application of the fair use

defense to a

Peak claim disagreed with this analysis.57 The court in
Advanced Computer Services of Michigan v. MAI Systems Corp. ruled

that an ISO's maintenance of computers running on licensed software
"clearly deprives" the OEM of license fees associated with the use of

that software and, thus, necessarily diminishes the market value of the
software license agreements.58 Similarly, the court in Triad II found that
the ISO diminished the potential market for sales of licenses for the

utility software because the ISO would have to purchase a license for
the software in order to use it.59

However, by assuming that ISOs should be included as potential

licensors of the software, these decisions rest on the faulty reasoning
that a potential market has been supplanted "to the extent that the

defendant, by definition, has made some actual use of plaintiff's work,

which use could in turn be defined as the relevant potential market. "60

57. Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1336-37 (9th Cir.
1995); Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 366 (E.D.
Va. 1994).
58. 845 F. Supp. at 366. OEMs also would point out that in cases of duplication of
the copyrighted work, the court may presume a negative market impact if the use of the
work is wholly commercial. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
593 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451
(1984) (holding that a commercial use creates a rebuttable presumption of negative mar
ket impact).
59. See Triad II, 64 F.3d at·l337.
60. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.05[A][4].
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Under the rationale employed in

Advanced Computer Services and
Triad II, a contested use of a licensed work always would cause a nega
tive market impact because a copyright holder always could charge li

censing fees to the user for the contested use. Thus, including unautho
rized users in the market of prospective software licensors automatically
establishes negative market impact in every fair use case because the
plaintiff always can claim the loss of a potential market "if that poten
tial is defined as the theoretical market for licensing the very use at
bar. "61 Given the extreme importance courts place on market impact,
this reasoning would lead to different fair use decisions depending on
whether the work was licensed or sold. Copyright holders effectively
could preclude recourse to the fair use defense by potential users of

copyrighted works simply by licensing those works. A magazine could
always claim lost permission fees for copies of articles made by a
teacher to distribute to her students simply by licensing each copy of its
weekly issue,62 thereby creating a negative market impact and possibly
denying the fair use defense to the teacher.63 However, the relevance of

the fair use defense to a particular use does not depend on whether the

copyrighted work is licensed or sold because the Supreme Court has

found no negative market impact stemming from the use of a licensed
work.64

61. Id. One commentator has noted that "by definition every fair use involves
some loss of royalty revenue because the secondary user has not paid royalties." Pierre
N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 105, 1 124 (1990); see
also American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929 n.17 (2d Cir. 1994);
William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661 ,
1671 (1988).
62. Licensing each copy of a magazine through shrink wrap licenses would require
little effort. Shrink wrap licenses, already heavily utilized in the software industry, oper
ate by sealing the copyrighted work with a label informing the customer that by open
ing the package or wrapper and breaking the seal they agree to the terms of the license.
See Committee Report: Division III-Copyright, in ABA SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHI' LAW, REPORT 181 (1987).
63. The Copyright Act specifically designates such an educational use by a teacher
as a probable protected fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
64. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994). The Court .
noted that while a copyright holder could assert harm to the potential market for li
censes of the work, the appropriate inquiry remains "the harm of market substitution."
510 U.S. at 593. But see Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, No. 85-0373-R,
1990 U.S. Dist LEXIS 19846, at *5 (W.D. Va. Apr. 1 6, 1990) (holding that "use of
photographic images used without license was not fair because such use denied the
[copyright holder] licensing fees which clearly affects the value of the copyrighted
work"). However, in Richard Anderson Photography, the challenged use involved the
creation and distribution of additional, proliferative copies of the photographs in ques
tion. The analysis would have been the same regardless of whether the pictures had
been sold or licensed.
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Including potential licensing fees in the relevant market would
have the practical effect of extending copyright protection to the un

copyrightable process of servicing the computer. A copyright violation

occurs in a

Peak claim only because the software is copied into RAM

by the ISO. Indeed, if the customer and not the ISO performed the cop
ying, no copyright infringement would occur and the OEM would be

unable to bring a

Peak claim against the ISO, even though the ISO does

the same task for the customer.65
Moreover, because an ISO's use of the software does not interfere
with any legitimate expectation conferred by the operation of copyright
law that the OEM has regarding income from the market for copies of

the copyrightable software,66 courts should not include the market for
royalties from use of the software as part of the relevant market. Even
in American

Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., where the court consid

ered potential licensing fees when evaluating market impact, the court

confined its analysis by concluding that "[o]nly an impact on potential
licensing revenues for traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed

markets should be legally cognizable. "67 The court defined traditional

markets as those that the copyright holder has "typically sought to, or
reasonably been able to obtain or capture. "68 In addition, the court only

considered markets for additional copies of the work, not for simple use
of the work.69 Because the copying in a

Peak claim does not create ad

ditional, usable copies of the software, including licensing fees in the

relevant market would subvert the purpose of the market impact analy

sis - defining and guarding" markets appropriately subject to copyright

protection.
In

Peak claims, the market for licensing fees from ISOs to service

computers is neither part of the traditional or normal market, which
consists of the market for software sales, nor part of the market pro
tected by copyright because the use of the software occurs as part of the

uncopyrightable process of servicing computers. Even if one could ar-

65. See supra notes 31-32.
66. When analyzing market impact, the equitable goals of the fair use doctrine call
for striking a balance between the public benefit derived by permitting the disputed use
and the personal gain to the copyright owner that will result from denying the use. See
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981). The less impact a disputed use
will have on the copyright holder's legitimate expectations of personal gain from own
ership of the copyright, the "less public benefit need be shown to justify the use." 677
F.2d at 183.
67. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994);
see also Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., No. 94-1778, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *13-17 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1996) (en bane).
68. 60 F.3d at 930.
69. See 60 F.3d at 916-17.
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gue that licensing fees for an ISO's use of the software while servicing
computers is part of a traditional market because OEMs bring copyright
infringement suits against ISOs, there is still a high level of "circularity
to the problem: the market will not crystallize unless courts reject the

fair use argument . . . but, under the statutory [fair use] test, [a court]
cannot declare a use to be an infringement unless" there is already a
market in existence "to be harmed. "70 A potential licensing market that
is either "unrealized" or "cumbersome" to enforce should not be in
cluded in the relevant market.71 In a

Peak claim, the potential market

for licensing fees only exists after the court denies the fair use defense,
not before, and thus should not be included in the relevant market be
cause it is an "unrealized" market.
Evidence of lost permission fees should not bear on a court's mar
ket impact analysis. Indeed, a copyright holder's ability to obtain per
mission fees is precisely what is at issue when examining the fair use

defense.72 Courts should avoid the circular reasoning that concludes that
a use is unfair, and that a user should therefore be required to pay per
mission fees to the copyright holder, simply because the copyright

holder is otherwise deprived of a fee by applying the fair use exception

to a claim of copyright infringement.73 The court must find that a user's

70. 60 F.3d at 937 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
71. See 60 F.3d at 939 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
72. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., No. 94-1778,
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *85 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1996) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
73. See Princeton Univ. Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *84-88 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "[i]t is circular to argue that a use is unfair, and a fee therefore
required, on the basis that the publisher is otherwise deprived of a fee"). Although the
en bane majority opinion rejected the "circularity" argument, the court limited its con
sideration of lost permission fees to revenues generated by "traditional, reasonable, or
likely to be developed" licensing markets. See Princeton University Press, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 29132, at *13-17 (quoting American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,
60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1994)). Consequently, the holding in Princeton University
Press should not alter the market impact analysis for a Peak claim. See supra notes 6769 and accompanying text.
In Princeton University Press, publishers sued a copying service for copyright in
fringement for reproducing portions of the publishers ' copyrighted work as part of
"coursepacks" used by professors to make materials available to the students. The pub
lishers claimed that the copying service failed to pay a permission fee to the publishers.
See Princeton Univ. Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 291 32, at *1-2. Finding a negative
market impact resulting from the loss of permission fees, the court concluded that the
circularity argument proved too much:
Imagine that the defendants set up a printing press and made exact reproductions
- asserting that such reproductions constituted "fair use" - of a book to which
they did not hold the copyright. Under the defendants' logic it would be circular
for the copyright holder to argue market harm because of lost copyright revenues,
since this would assume that the copyright holder had a right to such revenues.
Princeton University Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *13-14.
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use o f a work negatively impacts the value o f the copyrighted work, not

just that the user's failure to pay royalties causes a loss of revenue to

which the copyright holder may or may not have b�n entitled in the
first place.

2. Lack of Impact on the Relevant Market
Because ISOs do not compete with OEMs for the sale of operating
software, market impact, the most significant fair use factor,74 weighs in
favor of a finding of fair use. Although an ISO competes against an
OEM in the computer maintenance field, that arena does not comprise
part of the market for copies of the software. Copying of software into

RAM by an ISO, unlike copying of copyrightable material in general,
does not in any way reduce the customer's demand for that software be

cause the copying is nonproliferative. Even when a copy of software

exists in RAM, that copy cannot be distributed anywhere else.75 Anyone
who wants a copy of the software for a different use either would have

The majority's argument, however, confuses the impact on the market for permis
sion fees with the impact on the market for, or the value of, the original work. Making
exact reproductions of a book on a printing press undoubtedly would have a negative
impact on the market for the book and thus would not qualify as a fair use regardless of
any impact on permission fees. The problem with the majority's logic in Princeton Uni
versity Press is that it "would always yield a conclusion that the market had been
harmed because any fees that a copyright holder could extract from a user if the use
were found to be unfair would be 'lost' if the use were instead found to be 'fair use.' "
Princeton Univ. Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *86 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
Market impact analysis concerns itself with whether the use in question damages the
value of the original work or damages the value of derivative products such as cour
sepacks that the copyright holder wishes to market, not whether the use deprives the
copyright holder of permission fees. See Princeton Univ. Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
29132, at *84-85 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Because permission fees are what should be
paid if the use is found to be unfair, and consequently should not be paid if the use is
fair, the question of lost permission fees should not be considered until after the court
determines whether the use is fair. Significantly, a distinguished group of copyright law
professors filed an amicus curiae brief in Princeton University Press supporting a find
ing of fair use for this reason. See L. Ray Patterson, Amicus Advocacy: Brief Amicus
Curiae of Eleven Copyright Law Professors in Princeton University Press v. Michigan
Document Services, Inc., 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 183 (1994).
74. See supra note 40.
75. For example, the court in Peak suggested that a potential customer "desiring
to utilize" a program in ROM could "arrange to copy [the software] into RAM and
thus avoid purchasing the software. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d
511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Intl., Inc., 594 F.
Supp. 617, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1984)). However, any copy of the software in RAM would
not have an independent existence that could be transferred into permanent form for use
on the customer's computer. As a result, the customer could not avoid purchasing a
copy of the software by making a copy of the software in RAM
"

.
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to obtain it from another source, presumably the OEM, or copy the
software from long-term memory into another permanent location.76
In this way, J'eak cases can be distinguished from other computer
copying cases. For example, in

Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, the

court held that downloaders of photographs from a computer bulletin
board were not entitled to the fair use defense because their ability to
view the photographs necessarily decreased the market for those pic
tures.77 Similarly, the court in

Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Maphia, refused

to apply the fair use defense to downloaders of computer game software
from a computer bulletin board because the ability to use the software
necessarily diminished the market for sale of the software to the
downloaders.78 In a Peak case, however, the ISO has no independent in
terest in buying or licensing the software for its own use. ISOs only
want to use the software for the benefit of the customer who already
possesses a licensed copy.79 As opposed to copying a book, which
would reduce the demand for additional copies of the book, an ISO's
use of the software when copied into RAM does not reduce the demand
for the software.80

An ISO cannot market its services as an alternative to purchasing

the software; an ISO offers its services as an alternative to the mainte
nance services offered by the OEM. If an ISO marketed alternative op
erating systems or utility software copied from the OEM 's software,

76. See Carol G. Stovsky, Note, MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.: Us
ing Copyright Law to Prohibit Unauthorized Use of Computer Software, 56 Omo ST.
LJ. 593, 608 (1995). This analysis also would apply to copies made on disk or tape for

archival purposes because such copies are made only as backups in case the computer
malfunctions during servicing and are destroyed after the maintenance process is com
plete. See discussion supra note 19. Of course, the analysis should only apply as long as
the ISO destroys and does not proliferate those copies in a way that supplants the mar
ket for the original software. The fair use defense would not protect an ISO's prolifera
tive activities from the reach of copyright law.
77. See Playboy Enterps., Inc. v. Frena, 839"F. Supp. 1552, 1558-59 (M.D. Fla.
1993).
78. See Sega Enterps. Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
79. Unlike other copyrighted works such as books that "need not be copied by the
reader . . . to be used," computer programs "must be copied to be used by the com
puter and hence, the user." Stovsky, supra note 76, at 595 (citing RAYMOND T.
NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 1-103 (2d ed. 1992)).
80. The analysis would be the same even if the operating system software and util
ity software were decoupled from each other because the lack of market impact and the
customer's necessity in using the software to operate the customer's computer success
fully would remain unchanged. In other words, although the utility/service software
would no longer be copied automatically into RAM whenever the computer was turned
on, the copying would still be necessary to perform the maintenance on the computer
and an ISO's use of the software would not alter the customer's demand for the
software.
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such activity clearly would create competition with the OEM for sales
of the original. However, such activity is impossible when the ISO sim
ply loads the software into RAM because it transfers the "copy" in
RAM to any other form of memory; only items in ROM or some other
form of permanent memory can be copied.
In this respect, ISO copying of software into RAM for the purpose
of servicing the computer parallels reverse engineering cases where
courts have found in favor of fair use. 81 Reverse engineering involves
the transformation of the machine-readable code of a computer program
into human-readable code by a programmer in order to understand how
the program interfaces with a computer and discover the requirements
for making a program compatible with that computer.82 Courts have
held that the process of translating computer code into language under
standable by computer programmers creates a copy of the software.83
In these cases, courts have found fair use because the defendant's
use of the software codes through reverse engineering did not coinpete
directly' with the plaintiff's sales of the software codes.84 In both a

Peak

case and a reverse engmeering case, although copying occurs, the copy
ing does not create additional marketable copies of the software. Rather,
it is a necessary step in the use of the software for purposes that do not
adversely affect the demand for the software.85 Indeed, the existence of

81. See, e.g., Sega Enterps. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
82. See 977 F.2d at 1518-20.
83. See 977 F.2d at 1518-20; Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
84. See 977 F.2d at 1523.
85. Never theless, the cour t in Triad II held that Peak claims differed from reverse
engineering cases because the ISO's use is "neither creative nor transformative and
does not provide the marketplace with new creative works" whereas reverse engineers
developing entirely new software do inject something creative into the market Triad
Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1336 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Accolade, 911 F.2d at 1523); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 579 (1994) (stressing the importance of the transformative nature of the use as a
strong factor for finding in favor of fair use). However, focusing solely on whether a
given use is transformative is perilously shortsighted. First, a use need not be transform
ative to be a fair use. For example, the copying of an article by a teacher to use in class,
one of the examples of fair use listed in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994), would not be consid
ered a transformative use. Second, the cour t in Triad II relied on its inquiry into the
question of whether the use is transformative as an intermediate step in determining
market impact of the use. See Triad II, 64 F.3d at 1336. The relevant software market in
a Peak claim, however, suffers no harm as a result of the ISO's use. Analyzing whether
the use is transformative as a way of measuring market impact would be a misguided
enterprise if a lack of market impact had already been established through an indepen
dent analysis.
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competition in the service market for a given computer system likely
will enhance, not suppress, the demand for that system.86
B.
Section

Purpose of the Use

107 also directs courts to consider the "purpose and char

acter of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature
or is for nonprofit education purposes" when evaluating the fairness of
a challenged use.87 The Supreme Court has ruled that "every commer
cial use of copyrighted material" creates a rebuttable presumption of an
unfair use.88 An ISO's commercial use of operating software thus cre
ates a presumption of unfair use.89 Nevertheless, despite this negative
presumption, a commercial use still may constitute a fair use if it has no
effect on the market for the copyxjghted material.90 Consequently, while
the purpose of the use factor may not weigh in favor of fair use, it
should not weigh against fair use either because an ISO's commercial
gain from the use of the software does not detract in any way from the
OEM's profits from sales of the software.
An analysis of the commercial nature of a given use should be
used to help determine the extent to which the infringing copy "super
sedes" the original work.91 Courts investigate whether the user stands to
profit from her exploitation of the copyrighted material in a way that di-

86. See Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 366
(E.D. Va. 1994) (concluding that an ISO's use likely "enhances the value of the [operat
ing] software" since the OEM "would lose business in the sale of [its] computers if
customers could not use ISOs to service" the equipment).
87. 1 7 u.s.c. § 107(1) (1994).
88. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1 984);
see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterp.,
471 U.S. 539, 562 (1986); Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1522 (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1 1 48, 1 1 52 (9th Cir. 1986)); NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 34, § 13.0S[A][l](c).
89. The court in Advanced Computer Services concluded that the commercial pur
pose of an ISO's use of copyrighted software weighed "substantially against" a finding
of fair use. The court concluded that the ISO's commercial use of copyrighted software
is "an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the holder of the
copyright" 845 F. Supp. at 365 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 451).
90. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589-95; see also Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1522 (hold
ing that the presumption of unfairness arising from a commercial use "can be rebutted
by the characteristics of the particular commercial use").
91. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. The Supreme Court rejected the proposition
that a commercial use automatically establishes an unfair use. See 510 U.S. at 584; see
also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl., Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J.,
concurring) (although fair use is "presumptively" unavailable where the use is commer
cial, " 'presumptively' does not mean 'always', and, in any event, the doctrine of fair
use
can be adapted to new purposes"), affd. by an equally divided Court, 1 16 S. Ct.
804 (1996). The Supreme Court, quoting Samuel Johnson, has noted that "[n]o man but
. • .
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rectly competes with sales of the copyrighted work.92 If the copying of
a work only serves as an intermediate stage in the use of that work, and
therefore any commercial benefit derived from the use is only an indi
rect result of the copying, the use of the work overcomes the rebuttable
presumption that commercial uses are unfair.93
Under these standards, the ISO's use of the software in a

Peak

claim successfully rebuts the presumption of unfairness associated with
commercial uses.94 An ISO's use does not compete with the OEM for
sales of the software.95 Rather, the copying of the software only serves
as an intermediate stage in the use of that work, and any resulting com
mercial benefit to the copier is an indirect result of the copying.
C.

Nature of the Work

The next factor under section

107 is "the nature of the copyrighted

work."96 " [N]ot all copyrighted works are entitled to the same level of
protection" under fair use analysis.97 Specifically, courts have held that
a blockhead ever wrote, except for money." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (quoting 3 Bos
WELL's LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (G. Hill ed., 1934)).
92. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562; Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Pub
lishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 690 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 500 F.2d 1221 (2nd Cir. 1974).
93. See Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1522-23.
94. See 977 F.2d at 1522-23. ISOs also have argued that the purpose of the use
factor weighs in favor of fair use because the ISOs use of the software provides a pub
lic benefit See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., No. C92 1539-FMS, 1994
WL 446049, at *11 (N.D. Cal: Mar. 18, 1994). Commercial uses that result in public
benefit may qualify as fair uses. See Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1523; MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,
677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981). ISOs have claimed that their ability to use copyrighted
software in a Peak claim benefits customers who own computers using licensed
software by providing those customers with "a choice and price competition in the ser
vice and maintenance markets." Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *11.
Public benefit, though, "typically involves 'the development of art, science, and
industry . . . and not, as here, the purely financial interests of customers." Advanced
Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 365 (E.D. Va. 1994) (inter
nal quotation marks omitted). Thus, despite the financial benefits bestowed to customers
by an ISO's ability to service their computers, courts likely will find that the public
benefit exception does not apply to Peak claims. See, e.g., Advanced Computer Serv.,
845 F. Supp. at 365 (concluding that the public benefit exception did not apply because
"customers, having signed license agreements, were on notice that they could not allow
third parties to use the software"); see also Triad II, 64 F.3d at 1337 (detecting "no ap
preciable public benefit" arising from enhanced competition in the computer service
market that would justify a finding of fair use). Nevertheless, an ISO's public benefit
argument highlights the fact that an ISO's ability to use the software likely serves to en
hance rather than detract from the software's value. This result bolsters the case that the
commercial nature of an ISO's use should not weigh against fair use because it does not
have any detrimental impact on the value of the original work.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 75-86.
96. 17 u.s.c. § 107(2) (1994).
97. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1524.
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fair use should be applied more freely to the copying of "informa
tional," "functional," or "factual" works than to "creative" works, be
cause allowing users to copy more functional works does not threaten
to undermine the incentives copyright law creates to promote advances
in the arts and sciences.98 In a

Peak claim, the nature of the work

should weigh in favor of fair use because operating software is prima
rily a functional work undeserving of a high degree of copyright
protection.
Although courts have agreed that operating software is used for a
functional purpose,99 they are split on the issue of whether computer
software deserves a higher or lower degree of copyright protection. 1 00
On the one hand, the recent trend in fair use software cases has been to
apply a lower degree of protection to computer software, 101 especially

98. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 11 52-54
(9th Cir. 1986); Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 365 (citing Accolade, 977
F.2d at 1524 (noting that copyright protection does not extend to the functional aspects
of a work); N.A.D.A. Serv. Corp. v. Business Data, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 44, 48 (E.D. Va.
1986). Indeed, because authors would be less likely to open creative works to public re
view without stronger guarantees of protection for those works, courts have held that
more creative works deserve greater copyright protection. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burt
chaell, 631 F. Supp. 1432 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986); NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 34; § 13.05(A][2](a] (citing Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d 1148);
Diamond v. Am-Law Corp., 745 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Campbell v. Acuff
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994). This analysis comports with the underlying
purpose of copyright law. The Constitution provides that copyright law shall serve to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "To this end, copyright assures the right to their original
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information con
veyed by a work." Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50
(1991).
99. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., No. C92 1539-FMS, 1994
WL 446049, at *12-*13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994); Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F.
Supp. at 365.
100. Compare Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1224-25 (3d Cir. 1986) and Digital Communications v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F.
Supp. 449, 457-59 (N.D. Ga. 1987) and Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World,
Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (extending a high degree of copyright
protection to all aspects of a computer program, including its functional characteristics)
with Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl., Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995), affd. by
an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct 804 (1 996) and Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1524-25 and
Computer Associates Intl., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (extending a
low degree of copyright protection to computer software, especially to a program's
more functional aspects).
101. See Pamela Samuelson, Counterpoint: An Entirely New Legal Regime ls
Needed, COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1995, at 11 (observing that although the "trend in
caselaw in the mid to late 1980s seemed to 'zig' in favor of an expansive scope of
copyright protection for programs, the trend in the early 1990s has been to 'zag' toward
a narrower scope of protection"). Many recent commentators have argued in favor of
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where the software is primarily a "functional" work.1 02 In particular,
the court in

Triad I ruled that operating system software is a functional,

utilitarian work.103 Other courts have concluded that software deserves a
high degree of copyright protection because it "is not a mere compila
tion of existing information . . . [but] is instead a specially designed and
crafted work which represents a substantial investment of time and
labor. " 104
Nevertheless, because of its functional nature, operating software
should receive less protection than creative works such as poems or
novels under fair use analysis. Operating software ensures the effective
operation of the computer so that it can perform the tasks for which it
was designed. Operating software, including operating system software
and utility software, is essentially utilitarian, and it should not merit a
high enough degree of protection to weigh against a finding of fair
use.1os
However, the court in

Triad I distinguished between operating sys

tem software and utility/diagnostic software, providing greater protec
tion to the latter.106 The court in

Triad I, reasoning that the computer

could operate without utility/service software but could not function
without operating system software, concluded that diagnostic software
was not "clearly functional" and deserved greater protection than operlowering the degree of copyright protection for computer software. See Peter S. Menell,
An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN.
L. REv. 1045 (1989); Frederick R. Warren-Boulton et al., Point: Copyright Protection
of Software Can Make Economic Sense, COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1995, at 10. But see
Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection For Computer Programs, Databases, and
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HAR.v. L. REV. 977
(1993) (arguing in favor of broader copyright protection for computer software).
102. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1524-26; Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *1 1-*13; see
also Apple Computer, Inc., v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983)
(holding that the method which instructs a computer to perform its operating functions
is not subject to copyright law protection). "Copyright provides strong but thin protec
tion to software, absolutely prohibiting piracy by duplication of disks or- unauthorized
distribution, but not protecting the methods by which software operates." Lionel Sobel,
quoted in Richard C. Reuben, No Lotus Position for Supreme Court: Experts See Con
fusion in Wake of Justices' 4-4 Split on Software Copyrights, A.B.A. J. 30 (April 1996).
103. See Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *12-*13.
104. Advanced Computer Serv. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp.
356, 365 (E.D. Va. 1994). Courts have often considered the financial investment of
copyright holders in developing their works when evaluating the nature of the work fac
tor. See Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 9 1 , 96 (2d Cir.
1977); Allen-Myland, Inc. v. I.B.M. Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
105. See David A. Rice, Sega and Beyond: A Beacon for Fair Use Analysis • • • At
Least as Far as It Goes, 1 9 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1 13 1 (1994) (arguing that functional
software deserves a lower degree of protection against copying under the nature of the
work analysis).
106. See Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *13.
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ating system software.107 Consequently, the court found the nature of
the work Wyighed against the fair use of service software because such
software was not "clearly functional." tos
The court in

Triad I, though, improperly departed from its own

standards. The court considered operating system software to be "func
tional" and to deserve a lower degree of protection because of the rela
tionship between operating system software and "any productive use of
the computer." 109 Utility software, like operating system software, plays
an essential role in insuring that the computer functions properly. The
customer does not purchase a computer to run utility software. Instead,
the customer purchases a computer to run certain application software
and buys the utility/service software only to make sure that the com
puter can continue to run the application software. In other words, util
ity software ensures that the computer can operate but does not perform
the functions for which the computer was designed. It is not an "elec
tive" component because without it the computer could not continue to
function.
Because it is designed as an essential component in ensuring that
the computer operates properly and does not perform any "productive
use of the computer," utility/service software should receive the same,
lower level of protection afforded to operating system software. Operat
ing software, including both operating system software and util
ity/diagnostic software, is supportive of the computer's main functions,
such as managing memory, checking for and displaying errors, listing
the files on a disk, formatting a diskette, and coordinating processing
functions.110 It does not perform the primary creative functions for
which the computer was purchased.111

107. See 1994 WL 446049, at *13. The court also noted that utility/service
software requires operating system software and not vice versa. See 1994 WL 446049,
at *13.
108. 1994 WL 446049, at *13.
109. 1994 WL 446049, at *13.
110. See CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note 9, at 114.
111. This is not to say that utility software does not deserve copyright protection
because it is primarily a functional work. Rather, this Note argues that in a Peak claim,
the fair use defense should apply because operating software, including both operating
system and utility software, is primarily functional in nature and thus deserves a lower
degree of protection in the fair use analysis. &e Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl., Inc.,
49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring) ("Utility does not bar copy
right . . . but it alters the calculus."), affd. by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804
(1996).
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Extent of the Copying

The remaining factor listed in section

107 is "the amount and sub

stantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a

whole."112 Courts have held that "[c]opying an entire work weighs

against a finding of fair use."113 Because an ISO copies the entirety of
the program into RAM, the extent of the copying factor would seem to

weigh against a finding of fair use if mechanically applied.114 However,_
courts have held that the extent of the copying factor is not dispositive
of the fair use issue whep. the user has no viable alternative but to copy

the work in order to achieve a use that is otherwise fair.115 As a result,

the extent of the copying should not preclude application of the fair use
defense because the software is loaded into RAM automatically by the
computer as a necessary function of the computer's operation and not
because the ISO intends to make a copy of the software. The ISO's
copying of operating software into RAM is not an exploitation of pro

tected creative expression, but a necessary use of the "functional" as
pects of a program.
II.

POLIC Y CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING FAIR USE

This Part maintains that courts should apply the fair use defense to

Peak claims because the policy considerations raised by the impact of
the Peak decision support a finding of fair use. Specifically, application
of the fair use defense will prevent OEMs from establishing a strangle
hold on the market for computer maintenance by bringing
against ISOs competing for service work.

Peak claims

Courts apply the fair use defense when the broader ramifications of

failing to do so conflict with the purposes behind copyright law, al
lowing courts the ability to tailor the application of copyright law to

meet new conditions and realities.116 The four statutory fair use factors

1 12. 17 u.s.c. § 107(3) (1994).
1 13. Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 365
(E.D. Va. 1994) (citing McGowan v. Cross, No. 92-1480, No. 92-1 584, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9134, at *4-*5 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 1993)).
1 14. See Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 365-66 (arguing that copying
the entire program into RAM weighs against fair use); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern
Express Co., No. C92 1539-FMS, 1994 WL 446049, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1 8, 1994).
1 15. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1994); Sega
Enterps. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1 526-27 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that
wholesale reproduction of a copyrighted work may be permitted as a fair use when a
user can only make use of the work by copying all of it); see also NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 34, § 1 3.05[D][4].
1 16. Any evaluation of the fair use defense must be circumscribed by the equita
ble demands of the fair use doctrine and guided by an understanding of the underlying
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serve only as examples to aid the courts' analyses of whether a given
use is fair; they do not serve as an "exhaustive enumeration" nor do
they provide "a rule that may automatically be applied in deciding

whether any particular use is 'fair.' " 1 17 Fair use analysis under section

107 "is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like

the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis." 1 18
The importance of the Ninth Circuit's holding in
overstated. Under the guise of copyright law, the

Peak cannot be
Peak decision allows

OEMs to reserve "an exclusive right to service the hardware on which
the software runs," effectively extending their copyright monopoly on
the software they produce into the computer service market.119 Because
an ISO must be able to tum on a computer while servicing it, 120 denying

purpose of copyright law. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 552, 560 (1986). Fair use enables courts to avoid stifling "the very creativ
ity" copyright law seeks to foster by protecting uses of copied material that further the
goals of copyright law. Campbell, 5 1 0 U.S. at 577 (quoting Stewart v.Abend, 495 U.S.
207, 236 (1990)); see also Iowa State Univ. Res. Found., Inc. v. Am. Broadcasting Co.,
621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980). Courts rely on the fair use doctrine to maintain a bal
ance between favoring competition and ensuring the protection of an author's creative
labor. See Computer Assocs. Intl., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702, 7 1 1 (2d Cir.
1992). As a result, courts strive to avoid any mechanical application of the fair use de
fense when faced with new situations arising from technological developments. See
1\ventieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1 975) (arguing that
"[w]hen technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright
Act must be construed in light of [its] basic purpose"); see also Triad I, 1994 WL
446049, at *7 (holding that "when adopting the principles of copyright law to new cir
cumstances, the development of the law is best served by attention to [the] underlying
principles [of copyright law], rather than by fruitless attempts to fit proverbial square
pegs into round holes.").
1 17. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.05[A). "The factors listed in 17
U.S.C. §107 are preceded by the words 'shall include,' and use of the term 'including'
is defined as 'illustrative and not limitative.' " Id. § 13.05[A] n.27 (quoting 17 U.S. C.
§§ 101 & 107; Campbell, 5 1 0 U.S. at 577); see also New Era Publications Intl., ApS v.
Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 588 (2d Cir. 1989) (Oakes, C. J., concurring) (empha
sizing the "nonexclusive" nature of the four factors).
1 l8. Campbell, 5 1 0 U.S. at 577; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552 & 560.
1 19. Stovsky, supra note 76, at 600.The ruling in Peak effectively enables OEMs
to monopolize the computer service market by enforcing copyright protection on com
puter operating system and utility/service software transferred to customers under re
strictive licensing agreements.In MAJ Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 5 1 l
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 1 1 4 S. Ct 671 (1994), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of a permanent injunction to MAI (the OEM) that prohibited Peak
Computer (the ISO) from servicing MAI computers running software licensed exclu
sively to MAI customers. See 17 U.S. C. § 502(a) (1994) (authorizing courts to grant in
junctive relief "to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright").
120. See discussion supra note 20.
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the availability of the fair use defense to ISOs significantly undermines
their ability to compete in the computer maintenance market.121
Despite the serious antitrust implications raised by this type of li
censing scheme,122 an OEM will remain exempt from antitrust proceed
ings under the

Peak doctrine because Peak gives the OEM copyright

protection and thus court-sanctioned unilateral control over the com-

121. See Ronald S. Katz & Janet S. Arnold, Fair Use of Operating System
Software: Square Pegs in Round Holes?, COMPUTER LAW., May 1994, at 1 ; Jeff A.
MacDaniel, Selected Recent Developments in Copyright Law, 3 Tux. INTELL. PROP.
LJ. 57, 60 (1994) (stating that the decision in Peak has "cast doubt on the viability of
the independent service organization (ISO) industry"); Richard L. Goff, Can Software
Copyrights Restrict Related Competition?, COMPUTER LAW., Oct 1994, at 9 (arguing
that a "combination of copyright protection and well-drafted software license limita
tions may lawfully accomplish some restrictions on competition" in the computer ser
vice market); Levin, supra note 20, at 671-73 & n.167.
122. If copyright protection applies, OEMs clearly have the unfettered ability to
preclude ISOs from performing computer maintenance by refusing to sell them software
licenses without violating antitrust laws. See infra note 123. However, if loading
software into RAM by an ISO did not create a "copy" of the software or did not con
stitute an infringing copy because the fair use defense applied, any attempt by an OEM
.
to force the customer to hire only the OEM for computer maintenance likely would run
afoul of antitrust law.
In order successfully to preclude customers from hiring ISOs to perform computer
maintenance without the benefit of copyright protection, an OEM would need to argue
that the restrictive licenses prohibited customers from using anyone other than the OEM
to service the customer's computer. Such a reading, though, likely would render the
contract unenforceable as an illegal tying of the sale or licensing of software to an ex
clusive contract for the OEM to perform computer service on computers using the
software, a practice the Supreme Court held to be a violation of antitrust law in East
man Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 1 12 S. Ct 2072 (1992) (holding that
an OEM's attempt to restrain ISO competition in the computer service market by refus
ing to sell spare parts necessary for computer maintenance implicated antitrust prohibi
tions against monopolistic activities). Because courts consider software licensing and
computer maintenance to constitute two separate markets, see Service & Training, Inc.
v. Data Gen., Inc., 963 F.2d 680, 684 (4th Cir. 1992); Advanced Computer Serv. of
Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 368 (E.D. Va. 1994), an OEM's at
tempt to use restrictive licensing agreements to prevent competition in the service mar
ket would be highly susceptible to an antitrust tying claim if copyright law did not serve
to prohibit such competition.
For a more in depth discussion of the antitrust issues raised by an OEM's attempt
to prevent ISOs from entering the computer repair business see David Bender, ISO Use

of System Software: Copyright Infringement? . . . Or Antitrust Violation, in INTELLEC

TUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1994, at 1 07 (PLI Pat, Copyrights Trademarks, and Lit
erary Property Course Handbook Series No. 390, 1994); Anthony L. Clapes, Software,
Copyright and Competition: The Use of Antitrust Theory to Undercut Copyright Protec
tion for Computer Programs, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST: 1995, at 553

(PLI Pat.,

Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No.
414, 1995); Barry Reingold, Lower Court Decisions in the Aftennath of Kodak, COM
PUTER LAW., Aug. 1994, at 21; Wall & Crompton, supra note 43.
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puter maintenance process for computers manufactured by that OEM. 123
Such a result clearly runs counter to the underlying purpose of copy
right law by granting copyright holders the benefits of copyright protec
tion in a market for an uncopyrightable commodity, the process of ser
vicing computers.124 Precisely for this reason, numerous commentators
have sharply criticized the

Peak decision as an inappropriate expansion

of copyright protection stemming from a misunderstanding of how
computers function and a misreading of congressional intent.125 In spite
of this infinnity, courts have consistently reaffirmed the holding in

Peak.126
123. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1 147 (1st Cir.
1994) (ruling that an OEM could refuse to allow ISOs access to the OEM's copyrighted
service software without violating antitrust law because copyright law does not compel
an OEM to share software with its competitors); Service & Training, 963 F.2d at 690
(selective licensing of a copyrighted work is not evidence of an illegal tying arrange
ment); In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litigation, 910 F. Supp. 1537, 1542 (D. Kan.
1995) ("Generally, the exercise of one's rights under the Patent and Copyright Acts,
even by refusing to license or sell one's protected work to a competitor," does not auto
matically create an antitrust violation); Advanced Computer Serv., 845 F. Supp. at 36870 (denying an ISO's antitrust claims against the OEM on the grounds that copyright
protection gives the OEM a valid monopoly). Because servicing computers necessarily
involves the copying of protected software, OEMs can restrict an ISO 's maintenance ac
tivities under copyright law without violating antitrust law, in effect collapsing the oth
erwise distinct software and service markets. See supra note 122. As a result, an OEM
could outright refuse to sell ISOs licensing rights to service customer computers without
violating antitrust law despite the general proposition that copyright law should not be
used "to support a tie over
noncopyrighted products." Tricom, Inc. v. Elec. Data
Sys. Corp., 902 F. Supp. 741, 744 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (citing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
124. Cf. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523-24 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that "an attempt to monopolize the market by making it impossible for
others to compete runs counter to the statutory purpose of promoting creative expres
sion and cannot constitute a strong equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair
use doctrine"). Indeed, at the trial that followed the decision in Triad I, Triad (the
OEM) admitted that the licensing scheme was employed as a strategy to protect Triad's
market in the service market, not as a means to protect its ability to control the prolifer
ation and distribution of the software. See C.R. 387, E.R. 212; C.R. 396, E.R. 371-74,
379-80 (cited in Appellant's Opening Brief at 3 1 , Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern
Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995)). This result is contrary to the strong concern
for the necessity of maintaining competition in the service market between ISOs and
OEMs expressed by the Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak, 1 12 S. Ct. at 2072 nn. 1 8 &
21.
125. See, e.g., Arriola, supra note 3; Levin, supra note 20.
126. See Triad II, 64 F.3d 1330; NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45
F.3d 231 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 1 1 6 S. Ct. 2249 (1 995); Roeslin v. Dist. of Columbia,
921 F. Supp. 793 (D.D.C. 1995); In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litigation, 910 F.
Supp. 1537; Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Serv., Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Tricom, 902 F. Supp. at 745; Advanced Computer
Serv., 845 F. Supp. 356; Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., No. C92 1539FMS, 1994 WL 446049 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994). In addition, the Peak doctrine is un.

•

.

December 1996)

Note - Fair Use of Computer Software

683

Without the benefit of the fair use defense, courts would be forced
into the ludicrous position of arguing that copyright infringement occurs
in one scenario where the ISO performs the activity itself and not in an
other where the customer performs the exact same activity with the ISO

standing over the customer's shoulder telling the customer what to
do.127 The Seventh Circuit in NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America,
Inc.,12il refused to apply the Peak doctrine where an ISO used a "dumb
terminal" to perform computer service.129 A dumb terminal consists of
a keyboard, an input device, a monitor screen, and an output device,
and though lacking any independent memory such as ROM or RAM, a
user on a dumb terminal still can send commands to the live computer

hooked up to the dumb terminal and view the results of those com
mands.130 In NLFC, the ISO used a dumb terminal connected by phone

line to the customer's computer to service the computer. Even though
the ISO in reality still performed the service, caused the software to be

copied into RAM, and then used the software in RAM, the court found
that the holding in

Peak did not apply to the use of dumb terminals.131

While employing a dumb terminal scheme or having the customer

turn on the computer and punch keys at the ISO's direction would allow

ISOs to avoid copyright infringement, a customer may not be too inter
ested in hiring an ISO when doing so would require the presence and

attention of the customer any time the ISO needed to turn on a com

puter or run a program. Causing such significant inconveniences for

customers likely would do as much to foreclose ISO access to the com
puter service market as would a strict application of the

Application of the fair use defense to a

Peak doctrine.
Peak claim would protect ISOs

from the unfair exploitation of copyright law by OEMs while avoiding
the necessity for focusing on nonsensical factual distinctions such as

likely to be overruled by the force of international obligations. International conventions
relating to copyright law to which the United States is a party are silent on the issue of
what constitutes the malting of a copy of computer software. See STEPHEN M. STEW
ART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS §§ 12.12-13 (2d
ed. 1989). Most notably, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis
tic Works, Paris Act, July 24, 1971, art. IX, para. 2, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221, allows a member country to determine
what constitutes the malting of an unauthorized copy under that country's copyright
laws.
127. See Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *9; see also supra note 32.
128. 45 F.3d 231 (7th Cir. 1995).
129. See 45 F.3d at 231.
130. See 45 F.3d at 231.
131. The court reasoned that since the copy of the software made into RAM was
created by the customer on the customer's computer, the ISO did not copy the software
even though the ISO was the one using the copy of the software via the dumb terminal.
See 45 F.3d at 231.
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whether the customer turned on the computer or whether maintenance
was performed through a dumb terminal.132
Because the holding in

Peak allows OEMs to extend the reach of

copyright protection beyond the scope supported by the goals of copy
right law, ISOs should be able to rely on fair use as a defense against a

Peak claim.133 Otherwise, OEMs receive a de facto copyright on the un
copyrightable process of servicing computers by licensing rather than
selling operating software to their customers.
CONCLUSION
"Applying copyright law to computer programs is like assembling
a jigsaw puzzle whose pieces do not quite fit." 134 In order to insure the
most effective application of copyright law in the relatively new arena
of computer software litigation, courts should strive to remain faithful
to the fundamental aims of copyright law and the equitable principles
underlying the fair use doctrine. Courts should allow ISOs to rely on
the fair use defense in a

Peak claim because the fair use factors on bal

ance weigh in favor of a finding of fair use: the commercial purpose of
an ISO's use of the operating software is offset by the fact that the use
has no negative market impact, the operating software is primarily a
functional and not a creative work, and an ISO has no viable alternative
but to copy the entirety of a computer's operating software when turn
ing on the computer. Such a decision also would make sense on policy
grounds: courts should not allow OEMs to monopolize unfairly the

132. Application of the fair use doctrine in a Peak claim would not infringe on an
OEM's legitimate use of software licensing agreements such as ensuring that customers
have to upgrade the software each time the OEM releases a new version. However, con
sidering an ISO's use of the software to be fair would protect customers and ISOs from
the improper use of licensing agreements designed to prohibit competition in the com
puter maintenance market In addition, the fair use defense in Peak claims would allow
the continued application of the Peak doctrine in cases where it may make sense, such
as prohibiting third parties from loading data or pictures into RAM that can be used as
a substitute to the purchase of the original (i.e. reading a book displayed in RAM that is
stored in ROM instead of buying an additional copy). For a discussion of the potential
implications of copyright law on the growing number of works accessible through com
puters that can be perceived in RAM see Jane C. Ginsbutg, Putting Cars on the "Infor
mation Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM.
L. REv. 1466 (1995).
133. The courts that have held otherwise demonstrate what one commentator de
scribed as the process by which "a series of legal determinations, each somewhat de
fensible as a mechanical application of statutory language and case law precedent, can
yield a result that is plainly at odds with the policies behind the statute it seeks to ap
ply." Johnson, supra note 31, at 328.
134. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl., Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995)
(Boudin, J., concurring), affd. by an equally divided Court, 1 16 S. Ct. 804 (1 996).
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computer service market by relying on copyright protection to stifle
competition in the related but uncopyrightable field of computer
maintenance.
Critics may argue that using the fair use defense to avoid the
plications of the decision in

im

Peak is nothing more than a subterfuge, an

attempt to circumvent a controversial ruling by relying on a convenient
but inappropriate doctrine. However, because the issues raised by a

Peak claim involve equitable claims about the valid scope of copyright
protection on software and the fairness of extending that protection to
the uncopyrightable work of servicing computers, fair use is an appro
priate defense. Fair use serves as a safety valve to avoid the conse
quences of strictly applying copyright law in certain situations when
such an application would contravene the fundamental purposes of cop
yright law.135 Thus, fair use should be available as a defense to a

Peak

claim to offset the inequitable results that would flow from a strict ap
plication of the

Peak doctrine.

1 35. See Rice, supra note 105, at 1 131 (arguing that fair use is an appropriate doc
trine to avoid the unfair results of strictly applying copyright law when dealing with
computer software).

